Why NASA Should Change Its Present Course by Abbey, George W.S.
POLICY BRIEF
Why NASA Should Change Its Present Course
George W.S. Abbey, Senior Fellow in Space Policy
INTRODUCTION
Human spaceflight and the U.S. civil space 
program are both well past their half- 
century anniversary. Yet for over five years 
and counting, the nation has not had the 
capability to launch humans into space. 
The space shuttle, the most advanced and 
capable spacecraft ever built, was arbitrarily 
retired in July 2011. Rather than continue 
to fly in space, U.S. shuttles now adorn 
museums across the country. The only U.S. 
human presence in space today is onboard 
the international space station (ISS).
 The ISS has proven to be an  
outstanding research facility and a  
model for international cooperation. 
America relies on Russia, an outstanding 
ISS partner, for flying U.S. astronauts to 
and from the station. The cost to the U.S. 
of such flights is a bargain, contrary to 
the comments of some observers. Russia 
provides not only flights to and from the 
station, but also a rescue vehicle that is 
attached to the ISS that can safely return 
astronauts to Earth in an emergency. 
America has no capability to accomplish 
either of these required functions.
 Without the space shuttle, carrying 
cargo to and from the ISS has become a 
problem. Russia has an unmanned vehicle 
that can carry limited cargo loads to the 
space station, but it has no capability to 
return cargo. Contractors SpaceX and 
Orbital ATK can provide logistical support for 
the ISS to a limited degree, but only SpaceX 
can return cargo.
 Looking ahead, the space station will 
play a critical role in helping to provide the 
answers that will enable long-duration 
human spaceflight. Every effort should be 
made to maximize research that will support 
this long-term goal on board the station.
CURRENT NASA PROJECTS
NASA is developing two major projects, the 
Space Launch System (SLS) and the Orion 
Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle. The initial 
version of the SLS is designed to lift a 70 
metric ton payload to low Earth orbit (LEO); 
another SLS version is planned to have an 
LEO capability of more than 130 metric tons, 
as directed by Congress. Yet to be defined 
are missions that utilize the larger specified 
lift requirement. The Orion spacecraft 
is larger than the Apollo spacecraft that 
carried astronauts to the moon. NASA 
is developing Orion, and funding the 
development by private industry of two 
additional capsules that will transport 
astronauts to the ISS.
 Orion and the SLS have had a significant 
impact on NASA’s budget, and the agency 
has very little money left over to use for 
actual exploration. During a joint Senate-
NASA presentation in September 2011, NASA 
stated that the projected development cost 
for the SLS project was $18 billion through 
2017, which included $10 billion for the 
SLS rocket, $6 billion for Orion, and $2 
billion for upgrades to the launch pad and 
other facilities at Kennedy Space Center. A 
subsequent independent cost assessment 
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 The present NASA budget, if properly 
spent, could support a return to the moon. 
This would necessitate a reassessment 
of the need for a NASA SLS—as opposed 
to using launch vehicles developed by 
industry—and the viability and usefulness 
of a NASA Orion spacecraft to support 
human spaceflight. The construction and 
assembly of the ISS has proven the value 
and usefulness of a large structure in space. 
Neither the Orion nor the two capsules 
being funded by NASA to carry crews to 
the ISS have any capability to support the 
assembly of large structures in space, 
such as the ISS. A shuttle-type reusable 
spacecraft developed by Boeing that has 
successfully flown several times in space—a 
scaled-up X-37—could not only accomplish 
missions envisioned for the NASA-funded 
capsules, but could also provide a capability 
to do assembly in orbit. And the assembly 
of new, large structures in Earth orbit could 
well contribute to the optimum architecture 
for human missions beyond Earth orbit.
 NASA’s current plan speaks of human 
flight to Mars but lacks any description of 
the architecture, spacecraft, or systems 
needed to achieve this goal—and more 
importantly, it fails to project the cost of 
such a voyage. 
 As the National Research Council’s 
congressionally chartered Committee on 
Human Spaceflight once wrote, for NASA “to 
continue on the present course … is to invite 
failure, disillusionment, and the loss of the 
longstanding international perception that 
human spaceflight is something the United 
States does best.” The committee made this 
comment in a June 2014 report. In the years 
since, NASA has nevertheless continued on 
the same course. As a new administration 
takes office, a critical reassessment of 
NASA’s current programs and future is 
essential to ensure the nation’s continued 
leadership role in human spaceflight.
report considered the projected costs and 
schedules to be optimistic. Production 
and operation costs for the SLS and Orion 
presently consume more than $3 billion 
annually. Two recent General Accountability 
Office (GAO) reports contain warnings about 
the costs and schedules for the SLS and 
Orion, and for Exploration Ground Systems 
(EGS). These three elements constitute the 
major components of NASA’s Exploration 
Systems Development Program. The GAO 
believes the projected costs for the SLS and 
EGS are too low, and raises concerns about 
the feasibility of a November 2018 first 
launch of the SLS. The GAO also states that 
cost and schedule estimates for Orion have 
failed to meet more than half of the best 
practices for creating such estimates, thus 
making them suspect.
 Three competing heavy-lift rockets 
in the same class as the SLS are under 
development in the private sector. SpaceX 
is developing the Falcon heavy booster 
and Blue Origin is developing the new 
Glenn booster. United Launch Alliance, a 
joint venture of Lockheed and Boeing, is 
developing the Vulcan rocket, with an upper 
stage being optimized for use between 
Earth and the moon. These are all expected 
to cost significantly less to fly than the SLS. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
NASA’s annual budget is substantial and 
its effectiveness is a function of how the 
funds are spent. The next logical step for 
extending a human presence beyond Earth 
orbit is a return to the moon. Mars is a 
“bridge too far,” with many unresolved 
technical issues. A mission to the moon, 
only three days from Earth, provides the 
opportunity to not only develop needed 
experience but also to resolve technical 
issues and prove and qualify the needed 
systems for a voyage to Mars. The world’s 
spacefaring nations, with the exception of 
the U.S., all support a return to the moon; 
such an effort would provide an excellent 
opportunity for the U.S. to continue the 
outstanding international cooperation 
demonstrated so clearly by the ISS. 
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